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I. INTRODUCTION
Prescreened credit offers bombard most American consumers on
a monthly basis, with many consumers receiving at least six such offers
in a single month.' Yet how do creditors obtain sufficient information
regarding consumers' individual creditworthiness to target them with
such pre-approved credit offers while still complying with privacy
protections?2 The answer lies in the provisions of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA or Act),3 an effort by Congress to strike a balance
between consumer privacy and the financial services industry's desire to
solicit new customers.4
The FCRA was enacted by Congress to "regulate[] the activities
of consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), the users of reports, and those
who furnish information to CRAs and provide rights to consumers
1. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress on Further
Restrictions on Unsolicited Written Offers of Credit and Insurance, Dec. 2004, at 30-31,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/UnsolicitedCreditOffers2004.pdf
[hereinafter Report to the Congress] (explaining the results of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve's national survey exploring consumer experiences with prescreened offers
of credit).
2. See Recent Developments in Privacy Protections for Consumers Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Commerce, 106 th Cong. (2000) (prepared statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal
Trade Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2 00 0/l0/pitofskystatement.htm
(noting that some existing national privacy protections include the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which focuses on regulating the collection of personal
information from children under the age of 13 from commercial websites directed to these
children or which knowingly collect personal information from them, and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which imposes certain disclosure requirements and limits on
financial institutions with respect to the information it shares with both affiliates and
nonaffiliated third parties).
3. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2000) (setting
forth protections and regulations for those who use, access, and collect consumer credit
information).
4. See Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that
Congress, vis-A-vis the FCRA, wanted to ensure consumers received a benefit sufficient to
justify a creditor accessing those same consumers' credit reports).
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affected by such reports."5 The Act regulates the use of consumer credit
information for purposes of denying or increasing the charge for credit
or insurance, employment opportunities, government benefits, and
certain other business transactions.6 The aim of the FCRA is to protect
consumers from privacy invasions and the "dissemination of false,
outdated, or misleading information by placing various obligations on
persons who use or disseminate credit information about consumers."7
Recognizing that consumer credit helps keep the wheels of commerce in
motion, the FCRA contains specific provisions to regulate the use of
prescreening lists for solicitation purposes.8
The FCRA regulates the actions of both furnishers and users of
consumer credit reports while also delineating the rights of consumers
with regard to their credit reports.9 To protect consumer privacy, the
FCRA limits the access an interested party may have to a consumer's
credit report.1° Creditors wishing to access consumer credit reports may
only access consumer credit reports for a "permissible purpose."" For
credit transactions that are not initiated by the consumer, the only
permissible purpose, absent consumer consent, is when a creditor
intends to extend a "firm offer of credit" in connection with its use of
the consumer credit information. 12  What actually constitutes a firm
offer of credit within the meaning of the FCRA, however, is unclear
from the wording of the statute alone. 13 Though the FCRA explicitly
5. ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING 5 (5th ed. 2002).
6. Id. at 5-6.
7. Id. at 6.
8. See generally id. at 3-6 (explaining how the widespread use of credit cards, coupled
with the high demand for consumer credit information from parties seeking to minimize the
risk of extending credit, make the credit reporting industry highly profitable yet ripe with
potential problems).
9. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (explaining the purpose of
the FCRA).
10. See § 1681b. The FCRA limitations are important, given that employers, creditors,
identity thieves, and even nosy neighbors could have an interest in viewing a consumer's
credit report. See id.
11. § 1681b.
12. § 1681 b(c)(1)(B). Permissible purposes outside of credit transactions not initiated
by the consumer include such things as use for employment purposes and use in connection
with insurance underwriting. § 168 lb(a)(3)(B), (C).
13. Compare Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 2004) (examining if
a purported firm offer of credit amounts to a sham offer of credit) with Kennedy v. Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 844 (5th Cir. 2004) (examining ifa firm offer of
credit may be conditioned on pre-set criteria), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
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defines "firm offer of credit," 14 recent decisions from the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits indicate that there is still some ambiguity in the
meaning of this term. 5 This ambiguity is troubling for both financial
institutions and consumers.1 6 Without clear guidelines, creditors may
unwittingly expose themselves to allegations of impermissibly using
consumer credit information. 7 On the other hand, consumers risk an
invasion of their financial privacy without receiving a sufficient benefit
in return.' 8
This Note explores the impact of the recent Fifth and Seventh
Circuit holdings in Kennedy'9 and Cole,20 which examine firm offers of
credit.2 Part II of this Note provides background information on the
FCRA and the FCRA definition of a firm offer of credit.22 Part III
examines the Fifth and Seventh Circuit interpretations of what
Moreover, some states have issued definitions in their consumer reporting statutes. In
California, for example, a firm offer of credit is "any offer of credit to a consumer that will
be honored if, based on information in a consumer credit report on the consumer and other
information bearing on the creditworthiness of the consumer, the consumer is determined to
meet the criteria used to select the consumer for the offer and the consumer is able to
provide any real property collateral specified in the offer." See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §
1785.3(h) (2000).
14. § 1681b(1) ("The term 'firm offer of credit or insurance' means any offer of credit
or insurance to a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on
information in a consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select
the consumer for the offer ... [possible conditions the firm offer may depend on are thenlisted].").
15. Compare Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 2004) (examining if
a purported firm offer of credit amounts to a sham offer of credit) with Kennedy v. Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 844 (5th Cir. 2004) (examining if a firm offer of
credit may be conditioned on pre-set criteria), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
16. See Christian T. Jones & Jeffrey P. Taft, Credit Screening: The Rest of the Story, 49
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 391, 397 (1995) (explaining that creditors depend on clear
guidelines to reduce risk, and the vagaries of the FCRA firm offer of credit requirement can
harm creditors and the economy as a whole).
17. See id. (explaining that violations of the FCRA can result in civil, criminal and
administrative penalties); Sheldon Feldman, The Current Status of the Law Governing
Prescreening, Including Permissible Postscreening Practices, 46 Bus. LAW. 1113, 1120
(1991) ("[F]ailure to conform to permissible prescreening practices can constitute a
violation of the FCRA.").
18. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 28-30, 34-36 (explaining that for
consumers, the benefits of relinquishing some privacy include a reduction in time and effort
spent shopping for a suitable credit card as well as increased competition among credit
issuers).
19. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
20. Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004).
21. See infra notes 48-143 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
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constitutes a firm offer of credit.23 Part IV explores the ways a creditor
may continue to utilize prescreened credit offers in accordance with the
recent Kennedy and Cole decisions.24  Part V examines how a
nationalized standard for evaluating firm offers of credit that is based on
Cole will benefit consumers, creditors, and commerce.25
II. FIRM OFFERS OF CREDIT UNDER THE FCRA
Congress enacted the FCRA in part to protect consumer
privacy. 6 Among other things, a consumer credit report may contain
information regarding "a consumer's creditworthiness, credit
standing,... general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living. 27  Creditors often use consumer credit reports to solicit new
customers by prescreening the myriad of consumers in the databases of
CRAs such as Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax. 8 In order to
prescreen consumers, creditors specify certain desired criteria and pay
the CRAs to compile a list of the consumers in the database who meet
the criteria.2 9 The final list provided to the creditor thus only consists of
those consumers who pass the screening criteria.30  The actual
information that a CRA may reveal to creditors regarding the consumers
on the prescreening list, however, is restricted by the FCRA.3 1
23. See infra notes 48-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 101-43 and accompanying text.
26. E.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (stating that among thefoundations of the FCRA is the finding that "there is a need to insure that consumer
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a
respect for the consumer's right to privacy."); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (FDIC), Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Policy Statement-Prescreening by
Financial Institutions and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, FDIC Statements of Policy, Dec.
1991, at 5337, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-2900.html [hereinafterFFIEC Policy Statement] ("The purpose of the FCRA is to safeguard the confidentiality of
consumer credit information.").
27. § 1681a(d).
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey I. Langer & Andrew T. Semmelman, Creditor List Screening
Practices: Certain Implications Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal CreditReporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 43 Bus. LAW. 1123, 1123 (1988)(explaining how prescreening works); Jones & Taft, supra note 16, at 392-96 (detailing the
steps involved in prescreening).
29. See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 127-30 (explaining the use of
consumer credit reports for prescreening).
30. See Langer & Semmelman, supra note 28.
31. § 1681b(c).
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Creditors may only receive information such as consumer name and
address, a non-unique identifier solely for purposes of identity
verification, and any other information that does not identify the
relationship or experience that the consumer had with any particular
creditor or other entity.32 While this information does not reveal the
details of a consumer's creditworthiness, the mere fact that the
consumer is included on the prescreened list reflects that the consumer
meets a desired threshold of creditworthiness based on the criteria set
forth by the creditor requesting the CRA list.33 Prescreened lists thus
function as abbreviated consumer credit reports and are regulated by the
FCRA similarly to full credit reports.34 By limiting access to consumer
credit information under the FCRA, Congress endeavored to ensure that
consumers receive a sufficient benefit in exchange for having their
private credit information revealed.35
Creditors may only use consumer credit reports in connection
36
with consumer transactions. For a transaction not initiated by the
consumer, one of the two ways a creditor may access a consumer's
credit report is if the creditor intends to extend a firm offer of credit to
that consumer. 7 Extension of a firm offer of credit amounts to a
consumer transaction for FCRA purposes.38 Prescreening is therefore
permissible under the FCRA only if the creditor intends to extend a firm
offer of credit to each consumer on the list.39 The FCRA defines a "firm
32. § 1681b(c)(2).
33. See Langer & Semmelman, supra note 28 (explaining how prescreening works).
34. E.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App. (2005) ("A prescreened list constitutes a series of
consumer reports, because the list conveys the information that each consumer named meets
certain criteria for creditworthiness."); RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 128-29.
35. Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Report to
the Congress, supra note 1, at 28-29, 34-36 (finding that in exchange for relinquishing some
privacy, consumers reap benefits from unsolicited offers of credit, such as a reduction in
time and effort spent shopping for a suitable credit card and increased competition among
credit issuers).
36. RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 129.
37. § 168 1b(c)(1)(B). The only other way a consumer credit report may be obtained in
a non-consumer-initiated situation is if the consumer authorizes release of the report. §
1681b(c)(l)(A).
38. RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 129 ("A firm offer is necessary in the logic of
the statute because the report can be used only in connection with a consumer transaction.
Having a firm offer apparently is close enough.").
39. 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App. (2005) ("Prescreening is permissible under the FCRA if the
[CRA client, such as a creditor,] agrees in advance that each consumer whose name is on the
list after prescreening will receive an offer of credit.").
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offer of credit" as "any offer of credit or insurance to a consumer that
will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on information in
a consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to
select the consumer for the offer .... When a consumer responds by
accepting a prescreened credit offer, he effectively grants the creditor
permission to access his full credit report.4' Based on the consumer's
creditworthiness as reflected in the full, more detailed consumer credit
report, the creditor may or may not honor the credit offer.4 2  Thus,
despite being called a "firm" offer of credit, the offer extended in a non-
consumer-initiated transaction may in fact be conditioned upon certain
criteria.43
The FCRA also imposes a duty upon creditors to make certain
disclosures to consumers regarding the credit offer. a  Among these
disclosures is a statement that the credit ultimately may not be extended
if, "after the consumer responds to the offer, the consumer does not
meet the criteria used to select the consumer for the offer or any
applicable criteria bearing on creditworthiness.., or does not furnish
any required collateral. 45 In addition to the obligations creditors have
40. § 1681a(1).
41. See Langer & Semmelman, supra note 28, at 1127-28 (explaining that once a
consumer rejects an unsolicited offer of credit, no further screening of the consumer's
creditworthiness is allowed).
42. Id. (explaining that a creditor may, for example, use the detailed consumer report to
verify that the consumer had the same credit status reflected in the prescreening, but may
not use the detailed report to reevaluate the consumer's creditworthiness entirely, as doing
so would suggest that the creditor in fact did not intend to enter into a business transaction
with every consumer on the prescreened list).
43. § 168 1m(d); see also Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833,
841 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004). But see, e.g., Jones & Taft, supra
note 16, at 393 (explaining that a truly conditional offer of credit is "inadequate since it
indicates that the institution does not intend to enter into a credit transaction unless the
consumer meets a subsequent condition. For example, imposing a minimum income
requirement on the credit application it provides to consumers on the screened list would not
be a firm offer of credit.").
44. § 1681m(d). Though § 1681m states that users taking adverse actions based on
information contained in a consumer report must provide notice of the adverse action to the
consumer, the FTC has found that creditors do not have any obligation to those consumers
who do not qualify for the creditor's prescreened list. See Langer & Semmelman, supra
note 28, at 1127 (explaining how a consumer's exclusion from a prescreened list effectively
amounts to that consumer being denied a firm offer of credit but does not impose a duty to
disclose upon the creditor).
45. § 168 1m(d)(1)(C). Other disclosures required include that "the consumer received
the offer of credit or insurance because the consumer satisfied the criteria for credit
worthiness or insurability under which the consumer was selected for the offer" and that
"the consumer has a right to prohibit information contained in the consumer's file with any
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to those consumers whom they solicit using prescreened lists, creditors
also have obligations to the CRAs furnishing these lists. 46 Creditors
must certify to the CRA furnishing the list that they will make an offer
to extend credit to each person on the list.
47
III. THE FIFTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS WEIGH IN ON WHAT
CONSTITUTES A "FIRM OFFER OF CREDIT"
A. "Conditional" Firm Offers of Credit Permissible in the Fifth
Circuit's Kennedy Decision
In Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, plaintiffs, alleging
FCRA violations, asserted that they received pre-approved offers of
credit from the defendant creditors, which they accepted by returning
the corresponding applications.48 Upon plantiffs' acceptance, the
creditors then purportedly accessed the plaintiffs' full credit reports and
consequently withdrew the credit offers based on information contained
in the reports.49 The plaintiffs cite this failure to honor the "firm offers
of credit" as a basis for alleging that defendants violated the FCRA by
obtaining their credit information under false pretenses.50
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted defendants' motion to dismiss, noting that the
defendant creditor "had a legal right to decline credit" if (i) the
consumers did not satisfy the creditor's credit criteria, (ii) the credit
consumer reporting agency from being used in connection with any credit or insurance
transaction that is not initiated by the consumer." § 1681 m(d)(1)(B), (D).
46. See § 1681e(a) ("Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable
procedures designed to... limit the furnishing of consumer reports to [permissible
purposes, such as the extension of a firm offer of credit]. These procedures shall require
that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which
the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other
purpose.").
47. Id. (requiring creditors to certify the purpose for which the consumer credit report is
sought); 16 C.F.R. § 600.5(c) (2005); see also Langer & Semmelman, supra note 28, at
1126.
48. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
49. Id.
50. Id. Obtaining credit information under false pretenses is enforced under § 1681q,
which states that "[a]ny person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a
consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses shall be fined under title
18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both." § 1681q.
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application contained information about this possibility, and (iii) the
plaintiff acknowledged and agreed to such terms by signing the
application.5'
Moreover, the district court held that under the FCRA, a "firm
offer" is an offer that depends on the consumer meeting certain
criteria.12  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision in favor of defendants and upheld the district court's
interpretation of a firm offer of credit.53 The Fifth Circuit also affirmed
that under the FCRA, a firm offer of credit may only be conditioned on
the consumer meeting the criteria established by the creditor prior to
extension of an offer.5 4 In other words, under the FCRA, a creditor has
a permissible purpose for using prescreened lists if it extends a de facto
conditional firm offer of credit, subject to withdrawal pending
additional creditworthiness information. 5 Ultimately, the court found
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the FCRA because the
defendants' behavior frilly complied with the FCRA requirements for
56prescreening.
B. Firm Offers Must be "Valuable" to the Consumer Under the
Seventh Circuit's Cole Decision
In Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., plaintiff brought an action against
defendant creditor and car dealership for alleged violations of the
FCRA.5 7 Plaintiff asserted that she received an unsolicited pre-
approved offer of credit from defendants which, among other things,
51. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., No. 03-CV-00050, 2003 WL
21181427, at *1-2 (E.D.La. May 19, 2003).
52. Id. at 2.
53. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 389 F.3d 833, 841(5th Cir. 2004)
("firm offer of credit under [the FCRA] really means a 'firm offer if you meet certain
criteria"'), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004). Note that while firm offers may be veritable
conditional offers of credit, they may not rise to the level of being so conditional that the
consumer must meet a subsequent condition in order for the creditor to enter into a credit
transaction with that consumer. See FFIEC Policy Statement, supra note 26.
54. Kennedy, 389 F.3d at 841.
55. See id. at 841-42. A truly conditional firm offer of credit, i.e., one conditioned on
the consumer meeting subsequent conditions, however, would not be a permissible purpose.
FFIEC Policy Statement, supra note 26 ("A conditional offer of credit is inadequate since it
indicates that the institution does not intend to enter into a credit transaction unless the
consumer meets a subsequent condition.").
56. Kennedy, 389 F.3d at 841.
57. Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2004).
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contained vague terms, an ambiguous offer, and was a sham
orchestrated merely to justify obtaining her full credit report. 58 The
offer plaintiff received explained that she qualified for a credit card with
a credit limit up to $2000 and automotive credit up to $19,500.' 9
Further, the offer explained that the defendant creditor may require her
to pay off her currently financed vehicle and increase her down payment
and stated that she was guaranteed to receive a credit line of at least
$300 for the purchase of a vehicle.60  The offer later stated that
"guaranteed approval is neither expressed nor implied, [and] interest
rates may vary from 2.9% to 24.9% ....,,6 She cited these complaints
as part of her basis for alleging that defendants violated the FCRA by
prescreening her creditworthiness but extending an offer of credit that
was more a sham offer than a firm offer.62
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed plaintiffs complaint, holding that the defendants
permissibly obtained plaintiffs credit report for the purpose of
extending a firm offer of credit.63 Moreover, the district court found no
indication that the offer would not be honored and reasoned that
because the offer was for at least $300, some consumers would be
eligible for more than this minimum line of credit and thus it was a firm
offer within the meaning of the FCRA.64 The district court also
emphasized that the FCRA permits creditors to condition a firm offer on
the consumer's satisfaction of credit criteria established prior to contact
with the consumer.65
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's
decision.66 In addition, the Seventh Circuit court clarified the meaning
58. Id. at 723-24.
59. Id. at 722.
60. Id. at 722-23.
61. Id. at 723.
62. Id. at 724.
63. Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., No. 02-CV-01858, 2003 WL 21003696, at *5 (N.D.II1.
May 1, 2003).
64. Id.
65. Id. This facet of the holding is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Kennedy, which affirmed the creditor's right to withdraw a firm offer of credit upon
subsequent screening of a consumer's creditworthiness using the pre-established criteria.
Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 841 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
66. Cole, 389 F.3d at 732.
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of "firm offer of credit," finding that a firm offer of credit is one that,
upon examination of the entire offer and its attendant terms, is valuable
to the consumer 67 and not just a firm offer in the sense that it will be
honored.68 The court explained that the "consumer value" of a firm
offer of credit is assessed by looking at the specific terms of the offer,
such as the interest rate, the amount of credit to be extended, and the
method of computing interest.69 In Cole, the court found the offer to be
of questionable value because it (i) was ambiguous as to whether it
would be honored, (ii) had significant limitations, (iii) involved a
relatively small amount of credit, and (iv) lacked several material terms
that inform the consumer's value assessment.7 ° In sum, the Cole court
distinguished a firm offer of credit from a sham offer of credit by
holding that a firm credit offer has subjective value to the consumer, as
determined by the entire terms of the offer.7
C. Merging Kennedy and Cole
The Kennedy decision maintains that a firm offer of credit under
the FCRA includes those instances in which a creditor extends a firm
offer of credit in connection with use of a consumer's credit information
and later withdraws that offer if the consumer does not satisfy the pre-
established credit criteria.72 Thus, under Kennedy, a creditor may avoid
accusations of abusive use of a consumer's credit information by
showing not only that its firm offer of credit guaranteed some amount of
money and would be honored, but also that, if the offer was later
67. Id. at 726-28.
68. Id. at 727. While under § 1681a(1) of the FCRA, honoring the "firm offer of
credit" is a necessary element of the firm offer requirement, the Cole decision extends that
analysis beyond the words of the statute. See id.; Murray v. Household Bank (SB), N.A.,
386 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996 (N.D.III. 2005) (affirming Cole's holding that although a creditor
must disclose to the consumer in a clear and conspicuous manner that the offer is
conditional upon the consumer satisfying the pre-established credit criteria, analysis of the
adequacy of the disclosure is only triggered once an offer is deemed a valid firm offer of
credit).
69. Cole, 389 F.3d at 726-28.
70. Id. at 728 (noting that the offer contained conflicting statements regarding whether
the credit would be honored, the credit would have to be used for the purchase of a car, the
credit was for a mere minimum of $300, and the offer lacked details regarding the
repayment period and method of computing interest).
71. Id.
72. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 841-42, 844 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
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withdrawn, it was withdrawn because the subsequent assessment of the
consumer's creditworthiness revealed that the consumer did not satisfy
the creditor's pre-established credit criteria.73 In assessing the disputed
firm offer of credit in Kennedy, the Fifth Circuit utilized a relatively
basic two-pronged analysis, in which both prongs must be satisfied for a
legitimate firm offer of credit.74 The first prong of the analysis requires
that some amount of money be guaranteed, and the second prong
requires that the financial institution show that the offer would have
been honored if the consumer satisfied pre-established criteria for
creditworthiness.75
Among district courts in the Seventh Circuit before Cole, the
guidelines for creditors using consumer credit information involved a
two-pronged analysis that was similarly based on a superficial reading
of the language in the FCRA.76 Under this reading, a creditor may
permissibly use consumer credit information by extending an offer that
guarantees some amount of money, regardless of how much, and
showing that the offer will be honored as long as the consumer meets
the criteria for creditworthiness that had been used in the prescreening
process. 77  The Seventh Circuit's decision in Cole, however, added
depth to the first prong of this analysis.78 The Cole decision states that a
creditor must make efforts to disclose sufficient terms and conditions of
the offer to allow a consumer to make an informed decision about
whether the offer is of interest to him and to actually guarantee an
amount of money that is of value to a consumer.79
73. Id.
74. See id. at 841-44; Sampson v. Western Sierra Acceptance Corp., No. 03-CV-01396,
2003 WL 21785612, at *2 (N.D.III. Aug. 1, 2003) (noting that the FCRA requires that a firm
offer of credit i) guarantee some amount of money but does not specify any particular
amount and ii) must be honored).
75. Kennedy, 369 F.3d at 841-44.
76. See, e.g., Sampson, 2003 WL 21785612, at *2 (reasoning that because the FCRA
does not explicitly state a minimum amount of credit that must be offered in order for an
offer to constitute a firm offer of credit, the defendant's offer of credit was a firm offer of
credit because it extended some amount of credit and would have been honored if the
consumer met the credit criteria). Cf Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 726-28 (7th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a firm offer of credit is not simply one that will be honored, but also
one that has value, as determined by an assessment of the entire terms of the offer).
77. See, e.g., Sampson, 2003 WL 21785612, at *2; Tucker v. Olympia Dodge of
Countryside, Inc., No. 03-CV-00976, 2003 WL 21230604, at *3 (N.D.Ill. May 28, 2003)
("FCRA does not require a 'firm offer' to be in any particular amount.").
78. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 726-28.
79. Id. at 727-28.
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Thus, after Cole, the safest way for a creditor to use consumer
credit information within the FCRA is to insure that it guarantees an
amount of money with attendant terms that make the offer valuable to
the consumer and will be honored as long as the consumer meets the
pre-established criteria for creditworthiness. 80  The Cole analysis
thereby enhances the existing two-pronged approach by adding an
examination of the entirety of the offer to determine if the offer does in
fact amount to a firm offer of credit." If a credit offer does not pass the
muster of the Cole analysis, the offer may be a sham aimed solely at
gaining access to private consumer information and thus constitute a
violation of the FCRA.82
IV. How DOES A CREDITOR AVOID ACCUSATIONS OF ABUSE OF
CONSUMER CREDIT INFORMATION UNDER THE CURRENT STANDARDS?
The provisions of the FCRA provide the basic guidelines to
which a creditor should look in assessing whether its practices amount
to an abuse of credit information. 3 When a consumer has neither
authorized access to his credit information nor initiated the financial
transaction, a creditor must extend a firm offer of credit in order to
permissibly use the consumer's credit information.84 The requirements
for a firm offer of credit may then be analyzed using the same two-
pronged approach set forth in Kennedy and enhanced by Cole.85
A. The First Prong: Guaranteeing Some Amount of Money
While the FCRA does not expressly delineate an amount of
money that must be guaranteed, creditors must guarantee some
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, e (2000) (detailing permissible
uses of consumer's credit information and the requirement that creditors certify the use of
the credit information to the credit reporting agency, respectively).
84. § 1681 a(l) (defining a firm offer of credit as "[a]ny offer of credit or insurance to a
consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on information in a
consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer
for the offer").
85. See Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 841 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004); Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 726-28
(7th Cir. 2004).
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amount.86 The conservative creditor should note, however, that under
Cole, a nominal guarantee of money with highly restrictive uses and
vague or ambiguous terms is likely to lack the value that the Cole court
requires of firm offers of credit.87 To most effectively avoid an
allegation of abusive use of consumer credit information, a creditor
should therefore only extend valuable firm offers of credit to
consumers.
88
The Cole decision provides some guidance regarding what
makes a firm offer of credit valuable, but indeed, even this guidance is
incomplete. 89 From Cole, it is clear that the credit must be for more
than a nominal amount, and that $300 is unacceptably nominal.90 What
is not clear, however, is what amount of credit above $300 is necessary
for a credit offer to be valuable and firm under Cole.91 In addition, Cole
suggests that an offer that limits the use of the credit to a particular
purchase, does not disclose details regarding repayment and interest
computation, and makes equivocal statements as to whether the credit
would in fact be honored is neither valuable nor firm.92 Besides these
criticisms of the defendant's credit offer, however, the Cole decision
does not specifically indicate what an acceptable, firm offer of credit
would be.93 Nonetheless, until further clarifications are provided, it
would be prudent for creditors to make a good faith effort to incorporate
the somewhat nebulous Cole notion of "consumer value" in the firm
offers of credit that they extend to prescreened customers.94 Indeed, in
an advisory letter to national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of the
86. See § 168 1a(l); Tucker, 2003 WL 21230604, at *3 ("FCRA does not require a 'firm
offer' to be in any particular amount.").
87. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
88. Cf id. (reasoning that a firm offer of credit without value to the consumer defeats
the intent of the FCRA and thus should not be a permissible purpose for which a creditor
may access consumer's credit information).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. At least one district court has found that the Cole notion of consumer value
is an individualized issue that varies for each consumer. Murray v. New Cingular Wireless
Services, Inc., No. 04-C-7666, 2005 WL 3115813, at *6, (N.D.I1l. Nov. 17, 2005)
(reasoning that the need to assess the value of the offer for each consumer is not a barrier to
class certification).
92. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
93. See id. For example, Cole does not explicitly state that an offer of credit must allow
general use and provide no limitations regarding the use of credit in order to be considered
valuable and firm. Id.
94. See id.
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Currency (OCC) intimated that offers of credit should be more than
illusory to reduce creditors' exposure to compliance or reputation risks
for engaging in unfair or deceptive practices." Moreover, at least one
recent district court decision interpreting Cole has made it clear that
"[i]f, after examining the entire context [of the credit offer], the court
determines that the 'offer' was a guise for solicitation rather than a
legitimate credit product, the communication cannot be considered a
firm offer of credit., 96
B. The Second Prong: Honoring the Offer
Under both Kennedy and Cole, the second prong of the analysis
must still be met; creditors must show that if they condition the credit
offers on subsequent findings of creditworthiness, those subsequent
findings must still be based on the creditworthiness criteria used in the
prescreening. 97 Thus, the practice of conditioning a firm offer of credit
on subsequent screening ("postscreening") is permissible, but the
postscreening must not require that a consumer satisfy subsequently
imposed conditions.98 Cautious creditors should therefore ensure that
the criteria established for prescreening purposes are identical to the
criteria that are applied during the postscreening. 99  In particular,
creditors may wish to maintain clear internal documentation that
explicitly reflects the congruence between their prescreening and
postscreening evaluation procedures.' 00
95. OCC Advisory Letter from Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller &Chief Counsel, OCC, and Emory W. Rushton, Senior Deputy Comptroller & Chief Nat'lBank Examiner, OCC, to Chief Executive Officers of All Nat'l Banks, Dep't. & Div. Heads,& All Examining Pers. (Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with author), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004- I0.txt.
96. See Murray v. Sunrise Chevrolet, Inc., No. 04-C-7668, WL 2284245, slip op. at *2(N.D.Ill. Sept. 15, 2005).
97. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d) (2000); Cole, 389 F.3d at 728;Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 841 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004); see also RODRIGUEZ ETAL.,supra note 5, at 129.
98. See also Jones & Taft, supra note 16, at 393 (explaining that, for example, a
minimum income requirement on the application given to consumers on a prescreened list
would not constitute a firm offer of credit because it requires satisfaction of a subsequent
condition, namely, income).
99. Cf RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 129.
100. See Joyce A. Ostrosky et al., The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Time to Mind theDetails, THE INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec., 2001, at 50, 55 (explaining that it is important for an
organization to maintain documentation of its efforts to comply with the FCRA).
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V. ADOPTING THE COLE STANDARD WILL PROVIDE GREATER CLARITY
AND WILL BENEFIT CONSUMERS, CREDITORS, AND COMMERCE
The financial industry thrives on certainty and uniformity.01
The standard for determining creditor compliance with the FCRA-
required firm offer of credit should therefore also be uniform.10 2 Indeed,
the Cole court acknowledged the congressional intent for uniform
application of the FCRA. 10 3  Moreover, the FFIEC exists to ensure
uniformity in enforcement across agencies. 0 4  A uniform means of
measuring whether a creditor has extended a firm offer of credit in
connection with use of a consumer's credit report would thus promote
the efforts of the FFIEC.1
0 5
Many ambiguities exist in the landscape of firm offers of
credit.'0 6  In addition to the ambiguity that arises from the slight
variation between the Fifth Circuit, which maintains the status quo, and
101. See, e.g., Karen Flamme, 1995 Annual Report: A Brief History of Our Nation's
Paper Money, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/annual/1995/history.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (explaining that the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913,
which created the Federal Reserve System as the nation's central bank and advanced the
modem national currency, resolved the rampant counterfeiting and economic instability that
existed when there was a variety of regional currencies and no federal regulation or
uniformity).
102. Cf., e.g., George W. Arnett, III, The Death of Glass-Steagall and the Birth of the
Modern Financial Services Corporation, N.J. LAW. THE MAG., June 2000, 42, at 44-45
(asserting that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is a reflection of the federalization of financial
services regulation that is inevitable as banking, securities, and insurance gradually merge
into a single industry); Comm'n Notice, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Annual Conference on
Uniformity in Securities Laws (Apr. 9, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-
7524.htm#body2 ("Congress endorsed greater uniformity in securities regulation with the
enactment of section 19(c) of the Securities Act in the Small Business Investment Incentive
Act of 1980.").
103. See Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 726 n.6 (7th Cir. 2004) ("There is no
question that Congress intended a uniform application of the meaning of 'firm offer of
credit."').
104. See FFIEC, http://www.ffiec.gov (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) ("The Council is a
formal interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report
forms for the federal examination of financial institutions... and to make recommendations
to promote uniformity in the supervision of financial institutions.").
105. See id. Particularly given the lack of regulatory guidance interpreting the FCRA
and firm offers of credit, guidance from the Supreme Court would be helpful. See supra
notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
106. See Jones & Taft, supra note 16 ("[I]n the absence of federal legislation, the FTC or
FFIEC should take responsibility and offer additional guidance on permissible prescreening
and postscreening activity.").
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the Seventh Circuit, which inserts a new notion of "consumer value" to
the assessment of firm offers of credit,"°7 the Cole notion of consumer
value itself is also somewhat ambiguous. 08 Nonetheless, in an effort to
reduce the ambiguities, one national standard should exist so that
creditors and their attorneys know as definitively as possible whether
their practices are in compliance with the FCRA standards.'0 9 The Cole
standard provides the greatest clarity by giving depth to the existing
two-pronged analysis and should thus be the national standard. " 0
Although the Kennedy and Cole decisions both examine firm
offers of credit for purposes of evaluating defendants' FCRA
compliance, the decisions fine-tune different aspects of a necessary
examination."' The Kennedy decision affirms the right granted to
creditors under the FCRA to withdraw firm offers of credit from
consumers after the creditor has obtained information beyond the
rudimentary pre-screening stage. 12 On the other hand, the decision in
Cole provides a gate-keeping strategy for analyzing firm offers of
credit.' 1 3 By illuminating the criteria for analyzing a creditor's offer,
Cole facilitates an early determination of whether the creditor's offer
amounts to a firm offer of credit under the FCRA. 14 Adopting the Cole
standard, therefore, will extend the Kennedy decision by adding a
meaningful inquiry into the firm offer of credit and thereby eliminate
107. Compare Cole, 389 F.3d at 728 (stating that a firm offer of credit is firm if an
examination of the entirety of the offer indicates it has consumer value) with Kennedy v.
Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 369 F.3d 833, 841 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that a firm
offer of credit guarantees some amount of money and may be a conditional offer), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
108. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728; Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., No. 04-C-7666, 2005 WL 3115813, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2005) (interpreting Cole and
speculating that the notion of value goes more to damages to plaintiffs than to the ultimate
issue of defendant's compliance with the FCRA).
109. See Jones & Taft, supra note 16; cf FFIEC, http://www.ffiec.gov (last visited Jan.
8, 2006) (explaining that it tries to promote uniform supervision of financial institutions).
110. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
111. Compare Cole, 389 F.3d at 728 (deeming a creditor's firm offer of credit a sham
because it consisted of ambiguous terms, a guarantee of a nominal amount of money, etc.)
with Kennedy, 369 F.3d at 841 (deeming a creditor's firm offer of credit that was
subsequently withdrawn still an FCRA-compliant firm offer of credit).
112. See Kennedy, 369 F.3d at 841.
113. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
114. See id.
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some of the ambiguity among creditors seeking to extend firm offers of
credit.'
Moreover, adoption of the Cole standard would effectively
promote the congressional interest in balance intended by the FCRA."
6
In allowing limited access to consumers' private credit information,
Congress reasoned that consumers would reap the benefit of targeted
advertising that would reduce the time and effort they would spend
shopping for suitable credit products.' 17 The decision in Cole enhances
this consumer benefit by ensuring not only that targeted prescreened
offers of credit guarantee an amount of money and will be honored if
creditworthiness is satisfied, but also that the offer is in fact valuable
from the consumer's perspective." 8  In Cole, the consumer's
perspective of value becomes the definitive lynchpin for what
constitutes a firm offer of credit." 9
Furthermore, the Cole approach to firm offers of credit instills
increased confidence among prescreened consumers."2  If the
solicitations these consumers receive are only for offers of valuable
credit, consumer interest may be stronger than if all the credit offers
they receive are trivial, nonvaluable, and for insignificant amounts.'
2
'
With increased confidence and satisfaction with credit offers, more
consumers may be willing to accept offers, which ultimately may
generate increased competition and lower costs. 122 The Cole approach
115. Compare Cole, 389 F.3d at 728 (deeming a creditor's firm offer of credit a sham
because it consisted of ambiguous terms, a guarantee of a nominal amount of money, etc.)
with Kennedy, 369 F.3d at 841 (deeming a creditor's firm offer of credit that was
subsequently withdrawn still an FCRA-compliant firm offer of credit).
116. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 727 (noting that Congress, vis-A-vis the FCRA, wanted to
ensure consumers received a benefit sufficient to justify a creditor accessing those same
consumers' credit reports).
117. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 28-29, 34-36.
118. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
119. See id.
120. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that creditors find
prescreening solicitations to be a cost-effective way to attract new accounts).
121. See Cole, 389 F.3d at 727 ("It is clear that Congress did not intend to allow access
to consumer credit information 'for catalogs and sales pitches."' (quoting Trans Union Corp.
v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C.Cir. 1996))); Murray v. Sunrise Chevrolet, Inc., No. 04-C-
7668, WL 2284245, slip op. at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 15, 2005) (explaining that a firm offer of
credit that is extended to a prescreened consumer should not be so paltry as to amount to a
guise for solicitation).
122. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 36 ("In a competitive market, cost
savings for creditors and insurers translates into lower product prices, a greater range of
choices, and wider availability of credit or insurance for consumers, including those
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would thereby strengthen consumer confidence and generate a healthier
financial marketplace.123
Creditors would also benefit from adoption of the Cole
standard. 124  The greater control over risks associated with offering
credit, coupled with the increased consumer confidence that may
accompany the widespread adoption of the Cole standard, may very
well be a gain for creditors.125 Inasmuch as increased consumer
confidence translates into increased acceptance rates, creditors will reap
the benefit of growth in new consumer accounts and even greater cost
efficiency from the success that the Cole decision could promote with
regard to prescreened solicitations. 2 6  Moreover, the Cole decision
provides a useful gate-keeping mechanism for creditors to evaluate their
prescreened solicitations for FCRA compliance. 27 Cole provides
creditors with clearer guidance that can inform their decisions regarding
marketing, effective use of consumer's credit information, and FCRA
compliance. 12
8
Widespread adoption of the Cole standard, however, may also
concern creditors because it would require them to exercise greater
discretion in their prescreened credit solicitations.1 29 For example, the
Cole requirement of consumer value may have the effect of increasing
the amount of credit that a creditor must offer to prescreened
consumers.l"0 This effect would increase the risk creditors face, as they
may end up being forced to extend higher amounts of credit to
traditionally underserved.").
123. See id.; Jones & Taft, supra note 16 (explaining that if FCRA prescreening rules are
too vague, the economy as a whole may suffer).
124. Cf Cole, 389 F.3d at 728.
125. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 5 ("By having access to credit recordinformation for the purposes of prescreening, creditors and insurers are better able to control
certain risks related to offering these products."); Jones & Taft, supra note 16 (explaining
that creditors use sophisticated calculations to reduce the risk of unexpected losses from
credit offers, and vagaries in FCRA prescreening rules can negatively impact creditor's
risk).
126. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that creditors findprescreened solicitations to be a cost-effective strategy for attracting new accounts).
127. See Richard E. Gottlieb & Naomi A. Carry, Under Attack: The Seventh CircuitWeighs in on Prescreened Offers of Credit, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP., Spring-Summer
2005, at 180.
128. See id. at 180-82.
129. Cf Cole, 389 F.3d at 728 (holding that a firm offer of credit within the meaning of
the FCRA must have value to the consumer).
130. See generally id.
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consumers without the desired creditworthiness. 131 Indeed, Kennedy
affirms the creditor's right to withdraw a firm credit offer, but the risk
remains that a creditor will extend too high a credit limit to too many
consumers simply in an effort to meet the FCRA requirement for a
permissible purpose. 132 This risk, however, may be mitigated by the
implementation of tiered credit limits for different levels of
creditworthiness that are discovered upon postscreening. 133  Because
vagaries in the FCRA prohibit creditors from clearly determining
whether their prescreening practices comply with the FCRA and may
even increase creditor's risk, national adoption of Cole would
effectively replace the confusing nuances of the existing jurisprudence
and the FCRA with a more definitive statement.
134
Additionally, creditors may be concerned that, with the
implementation of a consumer value requirement to their use of
consumer credit information, they may incur costs to revise their
solicitation efforts to comply with the new guidelines. 135  Any costs
associated with becoming compliant with the new standard, however,
may be counterbalanced by the increased success that may arise from
increased consumer confidence in the prescreened offers. 136  Though
consumers may not explicitly know that they should be more confident
with prescreened offers, the disappearance of trivial credit offers may
consequently boost consumer confidence and interest.'37
131. See Jones & Taft, supra note 16, at 393 ("Given the FCRA's offer of credit
requirement, creditors must use safeguards when having a prescreened list prepared by a
consumer reporting agency. Without appropriate safeguards, the creditor could be forced to
extend credit to borrowers who may fall below its normal credit standards.").
132. See id.
133. Feldman, supra note 17; see, e.g., Jones & Taft, supra note 16, at 395 (explaining
that a creditor could offer a modest amount of credit as a back-up offer for those on the
prescreening list who do not qualify for a higher credit amount). While it is unclear what
amount would qualify as "modest," "it would seem reasonable that most consumers be
offered more than the absolute minimum terms granted by the creditor." Jones & Taft,
supra note 16, at 395.
134. Cf Jones & Taft, supra note 16 (explaining that creditors use sophisticated
calculations to reduce the risk of unexpected losses from credit offers, and vagaries in
FCRA prescreening rules can negatively impact creditor's risk).
135. See id.
136. Cf Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that creditors find
prescreening solicitations to be a cost-effective way to attract new accounts).
137. See generally id. at 5 ("[B]ecause prescreened solicitations are widely used and
must be "firm" offers of credit, consumers gain better awareness of available credit products
and rates.").
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Ultimately, by requiring firm offers of credit to have value,
creditors may find the need to implement more stringent prescreening
criteria to avoid being compelled by the FCRA to extend a firm offer of
credit for a large and valuable amount to an unqualified consumer."'
Effectively, a national Cole approach would thereby create a win-win
situation for consumers and creditors-creditors may prescreen more
selectively, thereby reducing risk, creditors' marketing costs may be
reduced since they will have to whittle down their prescreening lists to a
more targeted group, the amount of junk mail circulating in the
mailboxes of American residences may decline, 13 9 and consumers who
meet the prescreening criteria will get valuable offers of credit. 40
A recent district court decision in the Fourth Circuit followed
the Cole holding, which may very well be an indication that the Cole
decision will have some influence across the country. 14 1 Regardless of
whether Cole becomes the national standard for evaluating firm offers
of credit, however, it is currently the most probative analysis of what
constitutes a firm offer of credit. 142  Cautious creditors seeking to
maximize compliance with FCRA regulations should thus integrate into
their business practice the Cole concept of value as a part of a firm offer
of credit. 43
VI. CONCLUSION
The Cole decision furthers the goals of the FCRA.' 44 Cole
strengthens the requirement that a creditor accessing consumer credit
138. See Jones & Taft, supra note 16, at 393.
139. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 5 ("Written prescreened solicitationsfor credit ... carry some potential costs, including the inconvenience of receiving unwanted
mail .... ); ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 127 ("[Prescreening] is a common
source of junk mail. [It] is at the heart of all those preapproved credit card solicitations that
inundate many households.").
140. See Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 5 ("[C]ost savings for creditors...
translate into lower prices and wider credit. .. availability for consumers, possibly
benefiting those consumers who have traditionally been underserved.").
141. See Hyde v. RDA, Inc., 389 F.Supp.2d 658, 666 (D.Md., Oct. 5, 2005) ("[T]his
Court reaches the same result [regarding what constitutes a firm offer of credit] as the
Seventh Circuit in Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc.").
142. See Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 2004).
143. Cf Report to the Congress, supra note 1, at 5 ("The ability of creditors.., to tailor
offers of credit ... to consumers' pricing and product preferences at relatively low cost
enhances competition and marketing efficiency.").
144. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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information for a non-consumer-initiated business transaction provide a
worthwhile benefit to the consumer in exch,.nge for access to the
consumer's private financial information.145 Under Kennedy and Cole, a
creditor is well within its rights to identify creditworthy consumers
using a prescreened list, extend a firm offer of credit, and then withdraw
that firm offer once consumer acceptance reveals additional information
on that consumer's financial background. 146 Cole does not, however,
permit the creditor to access rudimentary consumer credit information
through a prescreened list and then extend a worthless firm offer of
credit to the consumer.
147
Nationalized implementation of the Cole decision would have a
positive impact on consumers, creditors, and the financial industry.
148
By restricting the definition of a firm offer of credit to those offers that
are actually valuable, Cole balances the privacy interests of the
consumer with the business interests of the creditor even more
effectively than the basic two-pronged approach used in Kennedy and
the pre-Cole jurisprudence. 49 A prescreened offer post-Cole is more
likely to be worth a consumer's consideration because of the reduced
possibility that the offer is merely an attempt to invade that consumer's
privacy. ' With consumers' increased faith in credit offers, creditors'
may achieve greater success with their prescreened solicitations, and
ultimately the health of the financial industry may prosper from this
symbiotic relationship.' 5' Integrating the Cole notion of consumer value
into firm offers of credit would thus benefit American consumers and
businesses by protecting the balance between consumer privacy,
creditor marketing, and the vitality of the financial industry.
15 2
APRIL B. CHANG
145. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
147. See supra2 notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 10 1-43 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 120-43 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 120-28, 138-43 and accompanying text.
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